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Ken Pollack is best-known for his guest analyst spots on CNN during the Iraq War. It 
was fitting that he perform such duty because his previous work, The Case for Invading 
Iraq, articulated the dangers posed by Saddam Hussein's regime. He was also a former 
Gulf military analyst at the CIA and was Director for Persian Gulf Affairs at the National 
Security Council. Prior to his latest work the best source on the subject under discussion 
was perhaps Chaim Herzog's Arab-Israeli Wars (1982) or the late Colonel Trevor N. 
Dupuy's Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars (1978). Now there is a new standard. 
Arabs at War is the refined product of Pollack's doctoral dissertation at MIT that 
explored the influence of Arab culture on military operations. 
The author attempts to judge Arab militaries in combat since 1948 based on different 
criteria, including unit cohesion, generalship, tactical leadership, information 
management, technical skills and weapons handling, logistics and maintenance, morale, 
training, and cowardice. Pollack takes the reader through a comprehensive analysis of the 
military operations of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria before 
concluding with an overview of the his principal findings. Pollack renders great service 
by shedding light on some little-known Arab versus Arab wars other than the now 
infamous Iran-Iraq War. The Libyan- Chadian conflicts from 1978-87, the Libyan-
Egyptian border disputes, the Syrian- Jordanian War of 1970-71, and the Iraq-Kurd Wars 
of 1961-70 and 1974-75 receive significant analysis. 
Pollack argues persuasively that one cannot understand the history of warfare in the 
Middle East strictly through measurement of material. This may seem a logical enough 
deduction but many previous authors have failed to fully explore the glue that keeps 
Middle Eastern armies together or facilitates their undoing. Some specific examples of 
the combat ineffectiveness of the various Arab armies over the last 50 years stand out in 
this book. 
Throughout Egypt's numerous wars with Israel, Pollack argues, Egyptian soldiers fought 
well in static positions, but the junior officers, "consistently demonstrated an 
unwillingness to maneuver, innovate, take the initiative, or act independently." (p. 146) 
The Iraqi Army consistently faltered in combat because the soldiers lack the necessary 
technical skills and had a "limited exposure to machinery" in Iraqi culture. (p. 265) The 
Arab Legion of Trans-Jordan receives high praise, organized and trained as it once was 
by British officers, but once British influence waned in the 1960s the Jordanian Army 
continually exhibited poor reconnaissance skills, an absolute necessity for manoeuver 
warfare. (p. 356) 
The Libyan Army demonstrated reasonable logistical capabilities during its war with 
Chad but "parroted Soviet tactics in the most stereotyped manner and without taking 
advantage of even the limited flexibility inherent in Soviet doctrine." (p. 401) The section 
on Saudi Arabia is the smallest in the book. With the exception of the 1991 Gulf War 
Saudi forces have seen little combat and that is probably a good thing. By the mid-1980s, 
despite massive expenditures on military hardware, Pollack points out, there were almost 
50,000 Americans, British, French, and Pakistani soldiers supporting 50,000 Saudi 
soldiers. (p. 428) 
Some of Pollack's judgments will no doubt elicit skepticism. He may have given far too 
much credit to the Tawakalnah 'Allah Mechanized Division of the Iraqi Republican 
Guard for its so-called "stand" against the US VII Corps in the 1991 Battle of Wadi al-
Batin. The coalition ground offensive only lasted four days and the Republican Guard 
held for half that time. However, Pollack did admit that the Tawakalnah ultimately fought 
"far below Western standards." (p. 254) 
The author also tries to rehabilitate the Western perception that Saddam Hussein lacked 
even rudimentary strategic awareness based on his deployments in 1991. Pollack suggests 
that Iraqi strategy rested on the assumption (ultimately erroneous) that the air campaign 
would last only a few days and that enough of the Iraqi Army would survive to push 
American casualties past the breaking point. (p. 238) This may seem rational, but Saddam 
grossly misjudged American faith in massive aerial firepower. Saddam could have gained 
fame as a strategist had he pushed on into Saudi Arabia and destroyed the lead brigade of 
the 82nd Airborne Division, one of the very first American units deployed during Desert 
Shield. Yet he was no strategist, and neither was Muammar al-Qadhafi of Libya whose 
running duel with the United States Navy during the 1980s "appear at best misguided if 
not irrational or simply foolish." (p. 421) 
At times Arab strategic planning demonstrated sophistication. The best example by far 
was the Egyptian planning for crossing the Suez Canal in 1973. However, Pollack makes 
clear that the inability of the Arabs to form resilient alliances and to trust each other 
through tough periods of combat was a problem they never solved. Acomprehensive 
study of Arab diplomacy and effectiveness at building strong alliances within the Arab 
world would make an excellent parallel study to this fine work. 
Pollack concludes that Arab armies consistently failed miserably on the battlefield in four 
key areas: tactical leadership, information management, weapons handling, and 
equipment maintenance. These were "without question" the principal sources of Arab 
misfortune. (p. 574) One of their greatest strengths, however, was unit cohesion. This 
may seem incomprehensible to some who could point to a wealth of impressionistic 
evidence arguing the opposite, but Pollack does a fine job of objectively analyzing 
numerous battles. He feels that "underestimating the unit cohesion of Arab armies is a 
mistake." (p. 555) He also makes a compelling argument that the Arabs, as a general rule, 
are not cowards who flee at the earliest opportunity. (p. 572) Yet rehabilitating the image 
of Iraqi soldiers surrendering to American unmanned aircraft in 1991 is no easy task. 
At almost 700 pages Arabs at War is a tour de force with a first-rate bibliography and 
numerous helpful maps. If there is any weakness in this book it might be Pollack's 
superficial handling of American aid to Israel in the form of airlifts or the absence of any 
discussion of the performance of the Afghani mujahidin against the Soviets in a guerrilla 
war, but then again, Pollack's emphasis is clearly on conventional war. The author has 
succeeded in taking a giant step forward in correcting many false assertions. The book is 
a major contribution to the literature of the Middle East conflict and goes a long way to 
proving that armies are cultural manifestations of the societies from which they are raised 
and that the Arabs still do not grasp the essential elements required to win on the modern 
battlefield. 
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